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This study investigates the impact of CEO succession on the financial performance of 
publicly listed Malaysian firms. A match-paired t-test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test are 
used to determine if there is a change in firm performance following CEO succession. The 
overall results show that performance improves following post-succession. We also find 
significant improvement in the performance of companies that experienced forced 
turnovers and subsequently selected outsiders as successors. On the other hand, forced 
CEO turnovers that are followed by internal successions disrupt firm performance. As CEO 
successions impact firms’ future performance, the succession planning process should be a 
priority for firms. 
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CEO successions provide a means for assessing the efficacy of a leader in shaping 
a firm’s fortunes. As noted by Davidson III, Tong, Worrel and Rowe (2006), 
leadership is an important component of a successful corporate governance 
mechanism, which can enhance firm performance. The effect of CEO successions 
on firm performance is still debated, despite numerous studies and renewed 
attention to this problem (e.g., Allen, Panian, & Lotz, 1979; Brown, 1982; 
Friedman & Singh, 1989).  
 
 Because of the importance of the CEO as the person who is responsible for 
setting organisational strategy, structure, environment and performance, the central 
concept of the business in any organisation originates from the CEO. According to 
Dalton and Kesner (1985), many financial periodicals, including Business Week, 
Forbes, Fortune and the Wall Street Journal, provide evidence that practitioners 
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and analysts agree that CEOs are the individuals responsible and accountable for 
setting organisational strategy, structure, environment and performance. Because 
CEOs significantly influence their organisations, any changes in the CEO position 
will significantly affect investors’ perceptions, thus affecting the future of the firm. 
 
 Previous studies have shown mixed results regarding the impact of CEO 
successions on firms’ subsequent performance. For instance, Friedman and Singh 
(1989) show that market reactions towards CEO successions are positive when pre-
succession performance is poor. On the other hand, when the pre-succession 
performance has been positive, the reactions have been negative. A study 
conducted by Korn/Ferry International on 132 Fortune 500 companies that 
underwent CEO successions from 2003 to 2005 revealed that a majority of these 
companies performed more poorly than companies that did not have CEO 
successions (Ghazali, 2012). Ghazali believes that the performance of companies 
not only depends on the knowledge and experience of an incoming CEO but also 
on the due diligence of the board in selecting a successor that aligns with the 
company’s vision, goals and strategy and who fits the culture of the company. 
There are several socio-political factors that determine the post-succession 
performance of companies. The profile of the CEO does not solely determine post-
succession performance.  
 
 Davidson III, Nemec, Worrell and Lin (2002) find that the stock market 
reacts more positively if the new CEO is an outsider and comes from an industry 
related to the firm’s operations. Meanwhile, Chung and Rogers (1987) find that in 
poorly performing firms, the selection of either an insider or an outsider does not 
significantly influence firms’ post-succession performance. This is because 
investors do not believe that a change in CEO will improve the firm’s future 
performance.  
 
 The above inconclusive results can be explained with respect to three 
views: common sense, vicious circle and ritual scapegoating (Davidson III, Worrel, 
& Cheng, 1990, Kesner & Sebora, 1994). The common sense notion popularised 
by Guest (1962, as cited in Davidson III et al., 1990) proposes that new leaders can 
cause positive changes in organisations and that post- succession performance will 
improve once an ineffective CEO is replaced. This is because the successor is an 
expert who can enhance the performance of a company. On the other hand, the 
vicious circle view predicts that the post-succession performance of a firm will 
become more disruptive because the succession of its CEO will destroy the fit 
between the firm and its environment, including its internal authority relationship. 
Finally, advocates of the ritual scapegoating view believe that a change in 
leadership will not affect firm performance because dismissals are a form of 
scapegoating and managers have nothing to do with poor performance. A 
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succession is a signal to outsiders that changes are taking place in an organisation 
(Kesner & Sebora, 1994).  
 
 To the best of our knowledge, except for Ishak, Ku Ismail and Abdullah 
(2012), and Ishak and Abdul Latif (2012), little is known about CEO turnovers and 
successions in Malaysia, particularly concerning the effect of CEO successions on 
firm performance. Ishak et al. (2012) examine the determinants of CEO turnovers 
and do not consider the events that follow, that is, post-succession events. The 
study provides evidence that turnovers are associated with, among other factors, 
poor company performance. On average, a CEO occupies his or her position for 
nine to 10 years before being replaced. Ishak and Abdul Latif (2012) go one step 
further by conducting an event study examining the impact of CEO succession on 
the share price of Malaysian listed companies. They find that the market is 
indifferent on the date of announcement but that there is an abnormal return of 
1.5% 10 days before the announcement. This study extends the work of Ishak et al. 
(2012) by examining CEO successions and events that occur following the vacancy 
of the CEO position. Because turnovers are generally the result of poor 
performance, our study examines whether new CEOs can enhance company 
performance. In particular, we examine whether a CEO’s origin and the nature of 
the turnover is associated with post-succession performance. Our study differs 
from that of Ishak and Abdul Latif  in that we measure firm performance by return 
on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q, which both consider the long-term effects of 
successions. This study contributes significantly to the body of knowledge on CEO 
succession. It will serve as an important input for company boards in selecting new 
CEOs and effectively implementing their succession plans.   
 
 A CEO successor can be selected from within the company (insider) or 
from outside the company (outsider). Furthermore, the succession can be an 
outcome of either a forced or voluntary turnover. These factors may affect post-
succession performance differently. The objective of this study is to examine the 
effect of CEO succession on the post-succession performance of listed companies 
in Malaysia. In particular, we examine whether the origin of the successor (internal 
versus external) and type of turnover (forced versus voluntary) impacts firm 
performance. Malaysia is an interesting jurisdiction for the study of CEO 
successions. First, there has been a growing number of CEO successions in 
Malaysia in recent years, and these events often receive great public attention. 
Nevertheless, studies on CEO successions in Malaysia are relatively limited. This 
study is also in line with the call for companies to plan their CEO successions, as 
leadership is important in determining company performance. A majority of related 
studies have been conducted in developed countries. To fill the gap, we feel that 
this study should be conducted in a country with an emerging economy, such as 
Malaysia. Second, the concentrated ownership of many Malaysian firms by 
families, a characteristic unique to the country’s business environment, makes 
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Malaysia an interesting jurisdiction for the study. As many companies are family 
owned, we expect that internal CEO successors would be more common than 
external ones.  
 
 The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Having discussed the 
background and literature related to this study, the development of hypotheses is 
discussed in the following section. The subsequent section presents the paper’s 





Brown (1982) discusses two main factors that influence post-succession 
performances: poor pre-succession performance and successor origin. Past 
performance determines the choice of a successor and the choice of a successor 
influences the subsequent performance of a company. Furtado and Karan (1990), in 
their summary of empirical evidence of management turnover, discuss the type of 
turnover that influences firms’ post-succession performance. The researchers claim 
that changes in CEO teams are of great interest to primary stockholders. Markets 
will respond to the changes as a signal of gain or loss in human capital or as a 




Pre-succession performance indicates how well organisations have used their 
resources. Poor performance provides a motivation for organisations to make 
drastic changes to their strategies and structures, and good performance indicates 
the stability and continuity of resource allocation decisions (Friedman & Singh, 
1989). Past performance, which is either measured by the long-term profitability of 
accounting performance or by upward movement in stock prices, significantly 
influences the selection of successors. 
 
 A poor pre-succession performance signals that a firm must take corrective 
action to avoid internal or external corporate controls. A number of studies reveal 
that the selection of an outside candidate is the optimal solution for improving poor 
pre-succession performance (Friedman & Singh, 1989). By using stock market 
reactions as a performance indicator, Friedman and Singh find that when pre-
succession performance is low, stockholders’ reaction towards succession is 
positive and high. It is argued that an outsider will bring new and fresh ideas to the 
company, which will lead to significant changes in the company’s strategies and 
policies (Furtado & Karan, 1990; Zinkin, 2010). As a result, the subsequent 
performance of the firm improves.  
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 In contrast, it is argued that a firm that has above average pre-succession 
performance tends to select an insider to maintain the status quo of the company. 
Dividing firms into high-performers and low-performers, Chung and Rogers (1987) 
find that high-performing firms that appointed insiders tend to perform better than 
high performers that appointed outsiders. However, the difference is not 
statistically significant.  
 
Successor Origin  
 
In CEO succession studies, the origin of the successor has been identified as a 
critical variable affecting firm performance (Kesner & Sebora, 1994). There are 
two pertinent questions that must be answered by the board of directors when 
making a decision regarding the origin of a successor. The first question relates to 
the quality of the successor and the second question to how suitable the successor 
is for the board members’ personal interests (Lauterbach, Vu, & Weisberg, 1999).  
 
 Salancik and Pfeffer (1980) contend that the appointment of CEOs from 
within the organisation represents a maintenance strategy. The new internal CEO 
will maintain the current strategies because he or she may be the one who was 
involved in establishing those strategies. However, some researchers (e.g., 
Cannella & Lubatkin, 1993 and Lauterbach et al., 1999) argue that the selection of 
an insider is only suitable for well-performing firms and that under-performing 
firms often need to hire external CEOs because they are more likely to be able to 
change the company’s existing strategies and evaluate its problems.  
 
 According to Khurana (1998), an outside candidate is only appointed after 
a thorough search. A candidate with an impressive track record is a testimony that 
he or she is superior to other internal or external candidates. Furthermore, for 
under-performing firms, outsiders are more preferable than insiders because the 
board expects that they will be more likely to take decisive actions to improve the 
firm’s situation. This view is supported by Karaevli (2007), who finds that external 
CEOs improve firm performance in poorly performing firms. However, Chung and 
Rogers (1987) provide evidence that the selection of insiders or outsiders by under-
performing firms does not significantly influence the stock market. This evidence 
contradicts the belief that an outsider will turn around a poorly performing 
operation. This evidence also shows that the market does not view an outsider as a 
person with the right capabilities. Evidently, investors do not believe that a change 
in leadership will alter the declining profitability of a poorly performing firm.  
 
 It is also argued that insiders are slow in recognising the urgency of the 
current problem and may pursue old strategies that are no longer effective (Chung 
and Rogers, 1987). Lauterbach et al. (1999) state that an inside selection 
deteriorates post-succession performance. Based on average excess return as a 
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performance indicator, the researchers find a significant difference between pre-
succession and post-succession performances. For an internal succession, the post-
succession performance decreases by 41% (from a pre-succession excess return of 
13% to a post-succession excess return of –28%). In contrast, for the outside 
selection, the post-succession performance increases by 35% (from a pre-
succession performance of –39% to a post-succession performance of –4%). Their 
results indicate that external successions preclude the firm from further 




Furtado and Karan (1990) argue that only organisations that have proper 
succession plans can be profitable in subsequent periods. The researchers further 
argue that different types of turnover have different impacts on post-succession 
performance, such as stock price reactions. Previous research classified turnover 




Voluntary turnover is defined as change that takes place due to the retirement of a 
CEO between the age of 54–55, illness or death, or the replacement of the CEO 
due to mergers or takeovers (Kang & Shivdasani, 1995; Denis, Denis, & Sarin, 
1997; Maury, 2006). Voluntary turnover is usually planned. Thus, it usually does 
not significantly affect a firm’s share price movement. Customary retirement is an 
example of a planned change whereby a CEO announces his intention to step down 
at some future date. In fact, Evans, Nagarajan and Schloetzer (2010) show that an 
incumbent CEO is more likely to be retained on the board for an extended period 
of time if the firm’s prior performance is good enough to ensure a smooth 
transition of power. As the change is anticipated, the successor has already been 
determined and groomed within the firm. As stated by Friedman and Singh (1989), 
planned retirements are generally smooth transitions that involve successors who 
are well known to the incumbent management. 
 
 Because the market is aware of the anticipated replacement of the CEO, it 
does not significantly react to the announcement of the incoming CEOs (Rhim, 
Peluchette, & Song, 2006). Denis and Denis (1995) show that normal retirement is 
not related to lower performance prior to management change and that a small 
improvement in performance usually follows such a succession. However, Salas 
(2010) finds that the stock price reaction is strongly positive if the senior 









Weisbach (1988) defines forced turnover as turnover that results from reasons 
other than customary retirement. However, identifying forced turnovers is difficult 
because publicly available sources do not identify them as such. Thus, prior poor 
performance is taken as a proxy that triggers a forced turnover.  
 
Generally, forced turnovers of CEOs are divided into two types: board-
initiated turnovers and CEO-initiated turnovers. Markets react differently to 
turnovers initiated by company boards compared to turnovers initiated by CEOs 
(Furtado & Karan, 1990). Friedman and Singh (1989) argue that board-initiated 
successions are more likely to occur as a result of poor performance. Thus, a 
positive stock market reaction is expected from a board-initiated succession. 
Board-initiated successions are not likely to occur in high performing firms. 
However, if this is the case, it can be interpreted as some internal political turmoil 
in the company rather than that the CEO failed to perform his or her duties. 
Therefore, board-initiated succession is not well-received in high-performing firms.  
 
 The second type of forced turnover is CEO-initiated succession. Examples 
of CEO-initiated successions are the illness or death of the CEO. Worrell, 
Davidson III, Chandy and Garrisson (1986) document a negative stock market 
reaction in response to the announcement of a sudden death of a CEO. 
Furthermore, they find that there is an offsetting positive stock market reaction 
when an insider is appointed following a CEO’s death. Placing an insider into the 
deceased position signals a continuity of the firm and that the situation is under 
control. Davidson III et al. (2006) reveal that when a firm announces the illness of 
its CEO and replaces the CEO with an insider, the abnormal return is negative and 
significant. In contrast, when the board replaces the ill CEO with its chairman or a 
former CEO, the abnormal return is positive but only marginally significant.  
 
 Friedman and Singh (1989) predict that CEO-initiated turnovers will lead 
to a positive market reaction, but at a level lower than that of board-initiated 
turnovers. Meanwhile, when a firm’s pre-succession performance is positive, CEO-
initiated turnovers will either signal that the CEO wishes to change his 
organisational affiliation or position and market himself to external parties. A 
negative market reaction is expected due to unwelcome change and disruption in 
external relations and the patterns of authority initiated in the departing CEO’s 
interest. 
 In summary, Brown (1982) and Furtado and Karan (1990) discuss three 
main factors that influence the consequences of CEO succession: prior 
performance, turnover type and the origin of the successor. Friedman and Singh 
(1989) claim that a firm’s poor past performance provides the motivation to change 
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its existing strategies and policies to meet its challenges. The researchers show that 
past performance has a significant and negative effect on stockholders’ reactions. 
Additionally, the selection of the successor, whether externally or internally, has 
become a crucial issue in poorly performing firms. Chung and Rogers (1987) claim 
that the replacement does not have a significant influence on a firm’s subsequent 
performance. In contrast, based on their findings, Cannella and Lubatkin (1993) 
and Karaevli (2007) suggest that an outsider is the best candidate for turning 
around a firm’s poor performance. Further, Furtado and Karan (1990) argue that 
type of turnover, whether forced turnover or voluntary turnover, also has a 
significant impact on the performance of firms. Voluntary turnover shows a small 
performance improvement, whereas forced turnover contributes to positive market 
reactions regarding the announcement of the management turnover (Friedman & 
Singh, 1989; Denis & Denis, 1995; Rhim et al., 2006). 
 
 According to the common sense view, changes in firms’ CEOs are 
expected to improve firm performance, especially that of poorly performing firms. 
Poorly performing firms tend to dismiss their underperforming CEOs and replace 
them with external candidates. It is argued that these external successors can 
improve firms’ future performance by introducing new strategies and policies to 
enhance the value and image of the firms. Thus, based on common sense theory, it 
is expected that changing CEOs who are responsible for poor past performance 
with outsiders will contribute to better performance in the future. Based on the 
foregoing discussion, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
 
H1:  CEO succession improves firms’ post-performance. 
H2:  CEO forced turnover improves firms’ post-performance more than 
voluntary turnover. 
H3: Outside CEO successors improve firms’ post-performance more than 
inside CEO successors. 
H4:  CEO forced turnover that is followed by external selection of a 
successor improves firms’ post-performance more than CEO turnover, 




The data consist of all of the companies listed on the Main Board and the Second 
Board of Bursa Malaysia that changed their CEOs between 2002 and 2005. There 
were 258 cases of CEO succession during the period. However, after omitting 
MESDAQ (Malaysian Exchange of Securities Dealing and Automated Quotation) 
companies (4), delisted companies (28), financial institutions (6), companies with 
incomplete financial data (26), companies whose annual reports are inaccessible 
(12), companies whose CEO changed more than once (33), companies with joint 
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CEOs (2) and companies experiencing mergers and take-overs (2), 145 succession 
events were included. To estimate post-succession effects, the two-year post-
succession performance was analysed to determine changes in firm performance 
after succession events.  
Post-succession performance refers to changes in firms’ ROA and Tobin’s 
Q. A two-year performance after succession is compared to the mean performance 
of two years before the CEO turnover. Differences in both the mean and median of 
these performance measures indicate whether the CEO succession improves, 
disrupts or has no effect on the firm’s post-performance. Successor origin is 
classified into either insider or outsider, and the type of turnover is classified into 
forced or voluntary. 
 
To determine any improvement or disruption in post-succession 
performance, both the mean and median of performance in the post-succession 
years are compared with the previous performances. The comparison is conducted 
for three categories: all samples, turnover type and successor origin. A match-
paired t-test and Wilcoxon Sign Rank Test are used to examine the difference in 
mean and median of firm performance before and after CEO successions. The 
performance is measured by firms’ ROA and Tobin’s Q. The change in the 
performances is calculated as performance of the later year minus the two-year 
average performance before the succession. Data on the firm’s past performance 
and post-performance are collected for the period of two years before and two 
years after CEO successions. For example, if the turnover occurred in 2002, data 
from 2000 to 2004 are collected. The selection of two years before successions is 
based on the argument made by Boeker (1992) that the turnover of a CEO does not 
happen immediately after poor performance. At least two years of consecutive poor 
performance is the best indicator for determining when to dismiss an 
underperforming CEO. 
 
 The classification of forced turnover and voluntary turnover is based on the 
reason stated in the change of management announcement made by a company on 
Bursa Malaysia’s website. The classification used is suggested by Huson, 
Malatesta and Parrino (2004), and Dahya, McConnell and Travlos (2002). They 
labelled a turnover as a forced turnover when news articles stated that an executive 
was “fired” or had “resigned”. In both cases, the CEO had to be less than 55 years 
old. In addition, if the announcement did not report any reason for the departure, 
such as death, poor health, or the acceptance of another position inside or outside 
the firm, the departure was classified as forced turnover. Furthermore, removal was 
considered forced turnover if CEOs were removed before the expiration of their 
three-year terms (Kang, 2002).  
 
 





Table 1 shows the distribution of companies according to turnover type and CEO 
origin. Of the 145 CEO succession events, 83 events (57.2%) are the outcome of 
forced turnovers, and the remaining 62 events (42.8%) are due to voluntary 
turnover. Whereas 74 of the companies selected insiders as CEO successors, 71 
companies selected outsiders as successors. Table 1 also shows that in forced 
turnovers, successors are more likely to be outsiders, and in voluntary turnovers, 
successors are more likely to be insiders. 
 
Table 1 
Distribution of companies by turnover type and CEO origin 
 
Turnover type                Successor origin 
 Insider Outsider Total 
Forced turnover  31 (41.9%) 52 (73.2%) 83 (57.2%) 
Voluntary turnover  43 (58.1%) 19 (26.8%) 62 (42.8%) 
Total 74 (100%) 71 (100%) 145 (100%) 
 
 Table 2 shows the distribution of companies by some selected company 
characteristics and the origin of successors. We observe that large companies, 
represented by Main Board companies, are more likely to have outside successors 
compared to their smaller counterparts. In Main Board companies, 55 (53%) CEOs 
were replaced by outsiders. Meanwhile, of 41 successions at Second Board 
companies, only 16 (39%) successors were outsiders compared to 25 (61%) 
insiders. This may be because Second Board companies are more likely to be 
family-owned businesses and thus are expected to retain family members as CEOs. 
Table 1 also shows that firms in most industries choose insiders as successors 
except for those in the consumer products sector, which prefer outsiders as 
successors. Out of the 28 consumer products firms, 20 of them (71%) selected 
outside successors. Again, this may be because family businesses are more likely to 
be involved in consumer products. In addition, we observe that outside successors 
outnumbered inside successors in 2002 and 2004. On the other hand, insiders were 
preferred as successors in 2003 and 2005. As far as firm performance is concerned, 
Table 2 reveals that insiders and outsiders are approximately equally distributed 
between low- and high-performing firms.  
 
As expected, we provide evidence that an outside successor is not welcome 
in family-and management-controlled firms. Of 41 successions involving family-
controlled firms, only 9 (22%) of the incoming CEOs were outsiders. In contrast,  
of 104 successions of non-family firms, 62 companies (60%) chose outsiders as 
successors. Similarly, from 98 successions in management-controlled firms, only 
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39 (40%) were selected from external sources. Another 59 companies (60%) 
























  Industrial products 
Trading 


























































   Low ( negative average ROA) 



































Table 3 displays the overall results of firms’ post succession performance by CEO 
origin and turnover type. The significance of the differences in mean and median of 
both ROA and Tobin’s Q is determined based on a paired-t-test and Wilcoxon Sign 
Rank test, respectively. Changes in ROA (Tobin’s Q) are measured as the 
difference between ROA (Tobin’s Q) at the end of the latter year and the average 
ROA (Tobin’s Q) in years t – 1 and t – 2. For example, a change in ROA for the 
period “pre-succession” to t + 1 is measured as ROAt+1 minus ROAaverage of t-1 and t-2. 
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Table 3 
Changes in firm performance surrounding CEO succession  
 
Means are presented above medians. Significance of mean and median changes are measured 
using a standard two-tailed pair t-test and a two-tailed Wilcoxon signed-rank test, respectively.  
 
Year All Successions 
n = 145 
Forced turnover 
n = 83 
Voluntary 
Turnover 
n = 62 
Outside Selection 
n = 71 
Inside Selection 
n = 74 
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       Note: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10  
 
Overall, Table 3 shows that there is an improvement in post-succession 
performance. The mean of the ROA increases significantly two years after 
succession events, showing an increase of 0.044 from the pre-succession period. 
Thus, this finding supports our hypothesis that CEO succession improves firms’ 
future performance (H1). The finding also agrees with the common sense view, 
which posits that post-succession performance will improve once an ineffective 
CEO has been replaced. The selected incoming CEO would be someone who can 
turn the company around. However, the change in ROA is not significant one year 
following the succession. With a new given task, a new CEO would take some time 
to align his vision and strategy with those of the company, and improvements will 
only be realised at least two years after taking over the helm. We also observe that 
the change in Tobin’s Q in years 1 and 2 is not significant, although the market 
reacts negatively immediately after the successions occur, as shown by a 
significant negative change of 0.032 in the median score. 
 
 A closer look at the overall forced turnover (without grouping into insiders 
or outsiders) reveals that there is no significant change in post-succession 
performance. Thus, H2, which states that forced CEO turnover improves firms’ 
future performance, is not supported. However, if we compare forced and 
voluntary turnovers, forced turnovers are better received by the market. At the very 
least, the market is indifferent and does not act negatively when there is a forced 
turnover. On the other hand, as far as overall voluntary turnover is concerned, the 
changes in Tobin’s Q mean and median show that the market reacts negatively to 
voluntary turnovers, significantly so in the year of succession and one year after 
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succession. This finding does not support Denis and Denis (1995) and Rhim et al. 
(2006). Rhim et al. argued that the market is aware of the expected replacement of 
the CEO and thus would not significantly react to the CEO’s replacement. 
Friedman and Singh (1989) argue that in a voluntary turnover, the transition should 
be smooth because it involves successors who are well-known to management. 
Although H2 is not supported, the market perceives that in a forced turnover, a 
company would be careful to select a new CEO who could perform better than the 
outgoing CEO. Thus, the market would not react negatively.  
 
 Table 3 also shows that the post-succession performance of firms whose 
incoming CEOs are outsiders improves significantly two years after succession, 
either in the ROA (an increase in median of 0.019) or Tobin’s Q (an increase in 
mean and median of 0.173 and 0.049, respectively). The finding supports Khurana 
(1998), who argues that outsiders are only appointed after a thorough search and 
that a candidate with an impressive track record is an indication that he or she is the 
best choice. As in the case of insiders, post-succession performances are worse 
than before, particularly when Tobin’s Q is used as a measure of performance. The 
significant negative changes in the mean and median shown in the last two 
columns of Table 3 indicate that the market is not in favour of insiders. This may 
be because insiders are not sufficiently pro-active and do not have the required 
sense of urgency to deal with the problematic situation at hand. As noted by Chung 
and Rogers (1987), insiders may continue using existing strategies that are no 
longer effective. Our results also agree with those of Lauterbach et al. (1999), who 
show that post-succession excess returns decline following the internal selection of 
a CEO and improve following the external selection of a CEO. Our findings 
support H3 in which we propose that external CEOs improve firms’ post-
performance more than internal CEOs. 
 
In our analysis, we divide our sample into two groups – forced turnovers 
and voluntary turnovers. For each sub-sample, we examine the consequences of 
selecting either an insider or an outsider as the CEO. Table 4 gives a closer view  
of the difference in performance of insiders and outsiders following either a forced 
turnover or a voluntary turnover. Under both sub-samples, we observe some 
glaring differences between the performance of insiders and outsiders. As for the 
forced turnover sub-sample, the ROAs show that outsiders can improve firm post-
succession performance, while insiders cannot. The Tobin’s Q results also show 
that performance improves in the case of outsiders and deteriorates in the case of 
insiders. The performance becomes more disruptive two years after insider 
succession. It appears that in a forced turnover, outsiders are more suited to being 
CEOs. Our findings agree with the arguments in favour of external CEOs 
(Khurana, 1998;  Chung & Rogers, 1987). Additionally, our findings support H4 in 
that a forced CEO turnover that is followed by an external selection results in better 
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Post succession performance based on turnover type 
 
Year Forced turnover N = 83 Voluntary Turnover N = 62 
 Insider N = 31 Outsider N = 52 Insider N = 43 Outsider N = 19 
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Note: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05,*p < 0.10 
 
 
In the case of voluntary turnover, Table 4 shows that outsiders do not 
significantly improve the performance of companies, as shown by the insignificant 
change in the ROAs and Tobin’s Q. However, we provide evidence that outsiders 
would make better CEOs, at least in the short term. This is shown by the significant 
negative change in the median ROA one year after succession (–0.018) and the 
negative changes in the mean and median Tobin’s Q in the year of succession and 
one year after succession. Consistent with the case of forced turnovers, a firm’s 
subsequent performance becomes more disruptive when an insider is selected as 
the successor following a voluntary turnover because both the mean and median of 
Tobin’s Q are significant.  
 
In conclusion, we find that in both forced and voluntary turnovers, external 
CEOs are more likely to outperform internal CEOs. Although with voluntary 
turnovers, outsiders do not show outstanding post-succession performance within a 
two-year period, the fact that they can maintain rather than disrupt firm 
performance is a good indication that they are adapting well to the company’s 
strategies and policies. The maintenance of performance is expected in voluntary 
turnovers because they are usually not the outcome of poor performance. In 
contrast, the selection of insiders as successors, following either a forced or 
voluntary turnover, deteriorates the firm’s future performance. The announcement 
of inside succession is viewed as a continuation of the firm’s existing managerial 
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practices and thus does not contain any new information with regard to its future 
prospects. 
 
 An additional analysis is conducted to compare the change in performance 
between turnover and non-turnover firms, the results of which are shown in Table 
5. The non-turnover firms are selected using a match-pair approach that matches 
the 145 turnover companies with the 145 non-turnover companies. The matching 
companies must be from the same market (Main Board or Second Board) and the 
same industry and have a similar size. 
 
 Table 5 shows that for turnover firms, there is a small increase in ROA two 
years after CEO succession. In contrast, when Tobin’s Q is used as the 
performance measure, the change in performance is not significant. Similarly, the 
performance of firms that do not change their CEOs does not change. Likewise, 




Changes in performance-turnover and non-turnover companies 
 
Year Turnover companies, N = 145 Non-turnover companies, N = 145 
 ROA Tobin’s Q ROA Tobin’s Q 
Pre-succession to t0   0.007 



















  0.044* 
  0.001 





  0.002 
 
Note: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05,*p < 0.10 
 
 Overall, when comparing the performance between turnover and non-
turnover companies, both groups of company show an incremental increase in 
performance. However, the change in the performance of turnover companies is 
more than the change in non-turnover companies. Thus, changes in companies’ 
CEOs can increase firm performance because investors view the succession events 
as corrective actions taken by companies to improve the firms’ future performance.  
 
 We also conduct robustness tests to observe the companies’ performance 
during the first two years after succession. Regression tests are conducted to 
determine whether the origin and type of turnover would have any influence on the 
post-succession ROA and Tobin’s Q while controlling for firm size, leverage and 
diversification. The results are presented in Table 6. 
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Table 6 
Robustness Tests – Regression results 
 
 ROA Tobin’s Q 








–.315 –2.920*** .781 1.353 
–.068 –2.098** .351 2.016** 
–.030 –.762 .039 .183 
.001 2.302** .010 4.116*** 
–.014 –2.036** –.093 –2.557** 
.068 3.531*** .030 .288 
.076 1.433 –.168        –.594 
 Adj. R2 .084  .124  
 F       3.208***  4.410***  
 
Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05,*p < 0.10; Origin = 1 if an outsider, 0 if insider; Turnover type = 1 if forced 
turnover, 0 if voluntary; Leverage = Total liability/ Total Assets; Business diversification = Number of business 
segments; Company size = Natural log of total assets; Origin*Turnover type = Interaction of origin and turnover 
type; ROA = Average return on assets two years after succession, (ROAt+1 + ROAt+2)/2; Tobin’s Q = Average 
Tobin’s Q two years after succession, (Tobint+1 + Tobint+2)/2 
 
The results show that insiders outperform outsiders during the period two 
years after succession. One reason that may explain this result is that the period is 
not long enough for the new external CEO to take corrective actions to improve 
firm performance compared to insiders who are already familiar with the affairs of 
the company. External CEOs may need some time to restructure the firm and plan 
other strategic actions to overcome firm underperformance. Another reason that 
insiders outperform outsiders during the period two years after succession is that a 
new CEO may take a “big bath” so that he or she can blame the company’s poor 
performance on the previous CEO and take credit for the following year’s 
performance (Yu, 2013). 
 
Nevertheless, our findings show that outsiders outperform insiders when 
Tobin’s Q is used as a performance measure. This implies that investors perceive 
the hiring of external successors as good news; thus, they react positively towards 
the appointment of external CEOs. Investors may view the selection of an outsider 
as a corrective action taken by companies to improve the firm’s future 
performance. 
 
 Our findings also reveal that large firms perform better than their smaller 
counterparts in terms of ROA and that less-diversified firms perform better than 
more diversified ones in terms of both performance measures. In addition, highly 
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leveraged firms perform better than low-leveraged firms in both models. However, 
we do not find any association between type of turnover and firm performance in 
either the ROA or the Tobin’s Q models. The performance of companies in both 





The main objective of this paper is to examine the effect of CEO successions on 
firms’ post-succession performance. This study finds that, on average, firms’ post-
succession performance slightly improves following CEO successions and that the 
improvement is significant two years after succession. There is no significant 
improvement in firm performance in the case of forced turnover. On the other 
hand, voluntary turnovers exhibit a drop in post-succession performance one year 
following CEO succession. Firms that select outsiders as successors improve their 
post-succession performance, and firms that select insiders as successors show a 
negative post-succession performance. In conclusion, post-succession performance 
improves when firms force a turnover and select outsiders as successors. 
Meanwhile, firms that are involved in either forced or voluntary turnovers and 
select insiders as successors face poorer future performance. Poor post-succession 
performance by internal CEOs compared to external CEOs implies that a proper 
CEO succession plan is lacking among Malaysian companies. The process of 
grooming suitable candidates should start early rather than wait until an outgoing 
CEO leaves a company. Companies should also be ready for the unexpected 
situations in which a CEO may be dismissed due to poor performance or illness.  
 
 Our study suggests that hiring a CEO from outside the company can 
improve firm performance. Companies should be brave enough to make the shift 
for the betterment of the company when inside expertise, talent and capability are 
limited. This may be the case in family-owned or management-owned companies 
in which the owners are not willing to let outsiders run their companies. 
Meanwhile, the small increase in performance following a CEO succession does 
not indicate that CEO leadership is insignificant. CEOs are always important 
because they have significant influence in determining a firm’s goal, strategies and 
use of resources. However, only exceptional CEOs are capable of counteracting the 
momentum of a firm’s performance. 
 
 The fact that we observe the performance of firms only two years after 
succession is a limitation of this study. Observations of firm performance over a 
longer term would be more meaningful. Other than the nature of turnovers (forced 
or voluntary), other factors, such as successor characteristics, environmental 
turbulence, and governance and ownership structure, may influence the 
relationship between CEO origin and firm post-succession performance. As far as 
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ownership is concerned, it would be interesting to observe whether a new family or 
non-family CEO would influence a firm’s post-succession performance. Thus, we 
propose that future studies should examine these issues, perhaps by using a more 
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